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submitted to each of the forty-eight legislatures, likewise concentrated upon problems arising from the war and equally disinclined to consider measures not directly connected therewith?
If the sole answer to these questions is in the affirmative, the prospects of even a perfunctory consideration of this important instrument are anything but promising. Indeed the danger would seem to be that it will be laid aside and forgotten (meanwhile remaining merely an unofficial "Restatement") amid the flood of war and post-war problems which are pressing for solution.
If, however, the courts have the power, and can be persuaded, to put this "Code" in force in their respective jurisdictions, we may expect earlier action because (i) the courts are not so over-burdened with problems of the war, (2) they are better qualified to pass on the merits of the instrument and (3) they do, or should, appreciate the need of an authoritative settlement of disputed questions in the law of evidence and of uniformity in its rules.
As an academic question this method was much discussed some years ago; but it is doubtful if the last word has been spoken about it and now that we are faced with "a condition and not a theory" a reexamination thereof seems timely. In resolving the question I believe that we may derive much valuable aid from legal history and that no sound or satisfactory solution may be expected without carefully tracing the development of our principles of both proof and judicial power. In doing so I find arguments (which I shall now attempt to set forth seriatim) (I) From Precedent; (II) From Inherent Power; and (III) From "Delegated" (Acquired) Power; in support of the view that authority pertains to the courts to promulgate rules of evidence.
II. THE ARGUMENT FROM PRECEDENT
i. The Classicai Background. For the beginnings of our law of evidence we must go far back of English history-back even of organized courts-for already then men had found methods, crude and barbaric though they were, which seemed to them sufficient for determining a disputed question.' These were utilized later by primitive tribunals until they could develop better ones. 2. "We cannot then doubt that the violence and bloodshed which the law licensed under certain circumstances were generally rife during the infancy of Courts of Justice, and that their earliest service to mankind was to furnish an alternative to savagery, not to suppress it wholly." MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM (1886) 387.
states, fundamental principles of proof were worked out by the judges or their advisers which foreshadow those recognized and applied today. Passing over other ancient systems let us glance at the Roman, where basic rules of proof (probatio) were formulated by jurisconsults three centuries before the Angles and Saxons invaded Britain. There we find Paulus (2d-3d cent. A. D.) 3 applying the onus probandi rule in precisely its modem form, 4 rules as to the competency of witnesses,' and even the "parol evidence" rule. 6 These were not the products of Roman legislation (although the Emperors did apply and extend them to new situations 7) they were "the decisions and opinions of individuals licensed to lay down the law", 8 which the praetor utilized and which had an authority at least equal to that of our reported cases. 9 Hence the tradition which Rome handed on to the new nations was not legislative but juristic. Their law of proof came from the courts and those who equipped them.
In the Hebrew law, both biblical and talmudic, rules of evidence, often quite modern, 10 were formulated by the rabbis and ecclesiastical lawyers, independently of legislation, and afforded a background for Christian law " whose promoters, the canonists,1 2 likewise developed a system of proof which contributed not a little to the English law of that subject.' 3 But here again the canonists were jurists; they formu- ." WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW (2d ed. 1912) 13. "The rule (presumption of innocence) thus found in the Roman law was, along with many other fundamental and humane maxims of that system, preserved for mankind by the canon law." White, J., in Coffin v. U. S., 156 U. S. 432 lated their rules by using materials from Hebrew, Roman and Germanic systems and adapting them to new conditions; but they received little, if any, aid from legislation, even of the ecclesiastical type.
2. Anglican Law. Precedent has ever furnished material for the growth of English law; 14 and nowhere is this more apparent than in evidence rules. The great dramatist found seven ages of man and our great authority 15 on the law of evidence (now, alas, no more) "marked seven divisions of (its) chronology". But in the first, the courts were still struggling to unshackle themselves from obsolete methods of proof.
It was only in the third period 16 (A. D. 1500-1700) that he found "the whole question of admissibility" discussed. That was because the jurors were ceasing to be witnesses and becoming real triers of fact 17 and the necessity for rules of admissibility had arisen. Here, too, was laid the cornerstone of our law of proof 1S-and it was laid by judges. Of the superstructure, slowly raised through the ensuing centuries, the builders were mainly the same. 9 Nor was this true of the common law courts only. Of the Star Chamber and Chancery, Holdsworth 2 0 says, "it became necessary for these courts to make their own rules and . . . some of these have had a considerable influence upon the making of our present law." 21
The fourth period (1700-1790) is marked by "the final establishment of the right of cross-examination" and "the rules of evidence were now developed in detail upon such topics as naturally came into new prominence." 22 Of course, they were developed by judges; no one else could have done it. The fifth period (1790-1830) was "the full spring-tide of the system" when "the established principles began to be developed [again, of course 16. In fact, it had arisen some time before, since in the Year Book of 21 Edw. IV (481) we find Chief Justice Brian submitting to the jury "all the evidence of both parties which could influence the jury as to the truth of the issue and all the evidences which were not material, he would not allow to be delivered."
17. HoiLsworrH, op cit. supra note 13, at 131 et seq. 18. "This control laid the foundation of the rules excluding certain kinds of testimony, which are the most characteristic feature of the English law of evidence." Id.
at 132.
"The exercise of this kind of control was in truth the foundation of that system of rules concerning evidence before juries which has since constituted so large and important a branch of the law of England." STARKIEm TRiAL By" JuRy (Little & Brown's ed.) reprinted in 2 LAw REVIEW 370.
ig. "The judges were beginning to recognize that there were some subjects of which they would take judicial notice . . . something different from the private knowledge of the judge. They were beginning to recognize the need of expert evidence," But it may be urged that the formulation of rules by judicial decision is a different process from that of promulgating them as a code. A little reflection, however, will disclose that the difference is purely a matter of form. 36 The practical identity of the two processes may be illustrated by recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. In one 37 the court avowedly changed the common law rule disqualifying a wife as a witness in behalf of her accused husband. About a year later it announced what was virtually a new rule, viz., that a confidential communication by a husband to his wife, through a stenographer, was admissible in evidence. 38 To sum up: Courts of the Anglo-American system, for nearly four centuries, have been making, changing and formulating, rules of evidence governing all subjects and situations which confronted them. If we are to resolve our inquiry in the light of legal history and precedent, 3 9 we must conclude that these judges and tribunals considered their powers in that regard as extending to the whole field of evidence. 39. "What constitutes judicial power within the meaning of the constitution, is to be determined in the light of the common law and of the history of our institutions as they existed anterior to and at the time of, the adoption of the constitution." State ex rel. v. Harmon, 31 0. St. 250, 258 (1877).
4o. "No court has adopted a complete revision of evidence law, but the total of all the evidence regulations adopted under their rule-making power by the several courts in this country is quite large. It can hardly be true that the courts have felt any doubt as to their power to deal with evidence because almost every set of rules for trial courts contains a few dealing with witnesses and methods of proof." Green, Finally, we should not overlook the contemporary processes of evidence rule-making by both international 41 and administrative 4 2 tribunals. The former have already developed a new law of proof, borrowing some of the best features of the world's chief legal systems.
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The latter bid fair to develop a situation where "the hard rules of exclusion will soften into standards of discretion to exclude."44 Here, we see not only new rules formulated, but old ones modified by the tribunals themselves. And in this they were merely following an age-long precedent. 45 
III. THE ARGUMENT FROM INHERENT POWER
i. Conceded Scope. Much has been written of the inherent power of judges to frame rules. Dean Wigmore 48 long since claimed it for "all rules of procedure not expressly or impliedly prescribed by the constitution." That claim has been challenged 47 in part; but we need not stop to resolve the merits of that controversy as a whole; for the challenger virtually concedes 48 enough of the claim to sustain our present thesis. As a result of his exhaustive study he finds the courts themselves asserting inherent power over three subjects, the third of which is "the conduct (or administration) of the court's business. "It is undoubtedly true that courts of general and superior jurisdiction possess certain inherent powers not derived from any statute. Among these are the power to punish for contempt, to make, modify, and enforce rules for the regulation of the business before the court, to amend its record and proceedings, to recall and control its process, to direct and control its officers, including attorneys as such, and to suspend, disbar, and reinstate attorneys. Such inherent powers of courts are necessary to the proper discharge of their duties." In re Evans, 42 appointment of an auditor for complicated accounts, 50 determination of when an action shall be tried, 51 or whether it shall be continued, 52 etc. ; but it is not apparent that any of these is more essential to the "control of the court's business" than is the determination of how it shall receive and weigh the evidence upon which its judgment shall rest. Without rules governing that process, courts could not function properly at all. If every judge and juror were free to follow his notions as to what constitutes proof, they would revert to the status of the oriental cadi, judging at the city gate. More than a century ago, Lord Brougham-a disciple of Bentham, as we have seen, 53 and a pioneer in the field of evidence law reform-judicially declared: "Those principles which regulate the admission of evidence are the rules by which the courts of every country guide themselves in all their inquiries." 54 2. Coextensive uwth Procedure. Now such rules are the very ones "for the conduct (or administration) of the court's business" and are included under the term "procedure" as defined by the experts," 5 and which Sir Henry Maine, 5 6 termed "the motive-power of the law"; because from them the other (substantive) branch of a legal system develops. He showed how primitive tribunals, forced to provide for their own operation, often utilized existing, though antiquated, 57 institutions and concepts and thus laid the groundwork for the earliest 5o. "An official called 'auditor' had long been known as part of the judicial machinery in certain cases brought in the common-law courts both of England and of the colonies; but the functions of the auditor in those cases were different. In the common-law action of account auditors were appointed in England, from the earliest times, to take the account, after the interlocutory judgment quod computet had been entered.
• . . No act of Congress has specifically authorized the adoption of the practice in the federal court. . . . The inherent power of a federal court to invoke such aid is the same whether the court sits in equity or at law. branch of the law,3s which included rules of proof, crude and barbaric though they sometimes were. 59 Nevertheless, the term "procedure" is not an ancient one in our legal terminology; but when it did arrive, it supplanted a phrase which included "evidence." 60 By the great weight of authority that inclusive signification continues, 61 and the tendency, 58. "So great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions in the infancy of Courts of Justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure; and the early lawyer can only see the law through the envelop of its technical forms." Id. at 389. Indeed, "in one stage of human affairs rights and duties are rather adjective of procedure than procedure a mere appendage to rights and duties." MAINE, EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS (6th ed. 1893) 252. ".. . many of these presumptions are part of the substantive law. But here, as in other cases, the substantive law has been evolved through the law of procedure; and in these cases, through a part of the law procedure which, being concerned with the manner of proof, naturally connects itself with the law of evidence . . . and so the law of evidence became a very distinct branch of the law of procedure." HoLuswoRTH, (19o) , all requiring affidavits of defense. Wash.-"There is excellent authority, from an historical, as well as legal standpoint, that the making of rules governing procedure and practice in the courts is not at all a legislative, but a at least in England, 6 2 has been to enlarge rather than to curtail it. Moreover, evidence is generally treated as a branch of remedial law and hence a part of lex fori, 6 3 which includes procedure.
3. Self-authorized Procedural Rule-Making. Until the recent revival of interest in the rule-making authority, few in America realized its antiquity. It was only when American juridical scholars 64 had pushed their investigations far back into Roman and English legal history that we learned how the courts had led the way in the development of procedure. We have seen 65 that questions of evidence were being decided at least as early as the 15th century; court-made rules of procedure appeared far earlier 66 and these sometimes related to evidence. That they did not contain more on that subject was doubtlessly due to the production of such rules by decision so that their formulation as a whole was not necessary nor practicable. In the United States rulemaking, in both state 67 and federal 68 courts, has continued. 62. In connection with attempts to harmonize the conflict of laws, a situation has arisen in which "the law of the United States is in an unsettled condition" while that of England is "one of extreme simplicity." Lorenzen, supra note 55, at 313, 314. The latter is the result of a liberal interpretation of the term "procedure," treating it invariably as a part of lex fori (Leroux v. Brown, 12 C. B. 8oi (1852)). The former seems to have been produced by a persistent attempt to find "substantive" rules of evidence which foreign courts need not apply.
63. Remedy is the means employed to enforce a right or redress an injury, and is governed by lex fori. Buffalo Forge Co. v. Fidelity, etc., Co., 142 Misc. 647 (N. Y. 1917 68. Certain rules were adopted by the Supreme Court at its first session, in February, 179o. See CARSON, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS HISTORY (Philadelphia, i89i) 152. In Hayburn's case, 2 U. S. 409, 411, 413, 414 (1792) Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court, told the Attorney-General in response to a request for information as to rules, that the court considered "the practice of the Courts of King's Bench and Chancery in England, as affording outlines for the practice of this court; and that they will, from time to time, make such alterations therein as circumstances may render necessary." As early as 1823 the Circuit Court for Georgia had adopted a rule which was construed by the Supreme Court in Patterson v. Winn, 30 U. S. 232, 243 (1831). In 1928, effective July i, the Supreme Court adopted "Revised Rules" for its own operation, of which rules 8, 15, 16, 18, 41 (4) pertained to evidence. Most of these rules affected the production of evidence, perhaps because of the Supreme Court's desire to leave questions as to the nature and effect, to follow the State Court's rule in accordance with Sec. 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789; but there was no intimation that the court considered its field restricted as regards rules of evidence for the Federal Courts.
69. "The character of English statutes . . . from the earliest days is strong evidence that Parliament confined itself to acting in aid of the courts, leaving to them the general management and control of practice." Tyler, supra note 64, at 774. What was true of procedure in general was even more so as regards its most important branch-proof. It was not until the middle of the 16th century that Parliament enacted a "comprehensive statute" against perjury and the remedy for compulsory attendance of witnesses. Meanwhile, however, the common-law courts had "used the efficient processes of subpcena which had been invented [rather borrowed from the Ecclesiastical courts] by the Chancery in the . . . fourteenth century." HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 184, referring to the statute of 5 Eliz. c. 9 (1562-3), which he says "begins a new epoch in the law of evidence." But here again the judges had anticipated the legislature.
70. See Marvel, supra note 64, for a brief sketch of this movement.
71.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 STATS. C. 20) Sec. x7, "authorizes the courts 'to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting (of) business in said courts"' and was applied by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard, 1O Wheat. 1, 22 (1825). Pursuant to the same section, and to a special act of Congress of 1824, Judge Harper of the Eastern District of Louisiana, promulgated, on Dec. 14, more than one-half of the states and practically all the territories; 72 so that by the opening years of the 2oth century, legislation seemed so effectively to have crowded out judicial rule-making that when the need for judge-made rules came to be recognized, 7 3 appeal was made to the legislatures, instead of to the courts themselves, for authority.
1829, "General Rules" of which XI related to evidence (motions for a continuance on account of absence of a witness), "General Rules of Practice in Admiralty" and "Additional Rules," of which II governed the taking of testimony. "General Rule" XV, authorizing a summary judgment on an appeal bond, was upheld by the Supreme Court in Hiriart v. Ballon, 34 U. S. 156 (1835).
In 1848 Congress passed an Act (9 STATS. 276, c. 150, § 4) empowering the American Commissioners in China "by decrees and regulation which shall have the force of law, (to) supply such defects and deficiencies" (in the common law and statutes). This authority was later transferred to the Ministers, one of whom (Burlingame) framed extensive court regulations in 1864 (reprinted in HixcKLa's Am. CoN- Such appeals have been fairly successful 7 4 and we have, finally, to consider whether, assuming that such authorization was necessary, the law of evidence is included therein. In some instances the inclusion is express 71 and in practically all of the "delegating" statutes, thus far enacted the terms "procedure" or "practice" or both are specified as proper subjects for exercise of the rule-making authority. We have seen 7 6 that "procedure" is treated, practically everywhere, as including 74. Professor Harris (supra note 67) has compiled a useful chart showing 14 states with "full rule-making power". A later article in the same periodical (at 65) lists 17 state Supreme Courts enjoying such power, with Missouri and North Dakota "on the way". In South Dakota it is reported that the framers of the new Code are segregating the sections relating to procedure for promulgation by the Supreme Court as rules.
Certain additions to the list given by Professor Harris must now be made, vic., Maryland. Under Code of General Laws, Art. 26, trial court rules governing continuances were upheld in Laurel Canning Co. v. R. Co., I 5 Md. 638, 81 Ad. 126 (1911) . Nebraska. The statute of 1939, June 5, "directs" the Supreme Court "to promulgate rules of practice and procedure . . . for admission and exclusion of evidence, the taking of depositions", etc. Mr. Gertner, supra note 67, classes Nebraska as a state without a rule-making act and Professor Harris writes of it, "there has been no exercise of the power granted by the constitutional amendment of 1920." On the contrary, not only have there been several instances of such exercise, but they are such as to form the most instructive examples of the practical identity of rule-making by decision and that by formal promulgation. Thus in deciding Penhansky v. Drake Realty, etc., Co., io9 Neb. 120, 19o N. W. 265 (1922) , the Supreme Court changed the rule precluding the contradiction of one's own witness and in the same opinion formally announced the new doctrine as a rule of the court. In Jessup v. Davis, I15 Neb. I, 211 N. W. igo (1926) the court reaffirmed the doctrine of an earlier decision (Miller v. Taxi Co., i10 Neb. 306, 193 N. W. 19 (923) ).
But for the constitutional amendment, nothing further would have been done; but the court then felt called upon to "promulgate" the rule. This, however, amounted to nothing more than it would have without the amendment; the sole change was in the form of expression. But the process did not stop there. After another decade, during which a new judge, with an exploring mind, appeared on the scene the question again came before the court, the "promulgated rule" was "revoked" and the original "rule", announced before the amendment, was restored, (Fielding v. Publix Cars, Inc., 13o evidence. "Practice" is a more popular term which, while not so broad as "procedure," is held sufficient likewise to include evidence. 77 2. So-called "Substantive" Rules of Evidence. As we have seen, 78 all positive law was once procedural ("adjective") and some that was such has now come to be regarded as substantive. Examples are the "parol evidence rule", now regarded as part of the law of contracts, 7 9 and the "conclusive presumption". 80 Indeed, there is high authority 8" for the view that all presumptions belong to the substantive branch; but that is disputed.
8 2 These are but illustrations of.a problem which is likely to confront the rule-maker as to various terms and subjects. But it must constantly be kept in view that his task is to frame rules of evidence and any branches of the law which belong to some other subject are not within his province. His initial task therefore would seem to be to identify and exclude all rules which are not evidential in character and it should not be confused with the attempt sometimes made to classify the rules of evidence themselves into "substantive" and "procedural" categories. A rule is either evidential or it is not; if the latter, it cannot be a class of the former and if the former, it belongs, as we have seen, to the field of procedure. But the rule-maker should not permit his course to be deflected by speculating over theoretical classifications of other branches.
Legislative Restrictions Upon the Ride-Making
Power. Certain delegating statutes 83 assume to prohibit rules effecting change of "the substantive rights of any litigant" and in such jurisdictions it becomes necessary to inquire what, if any, rules of proof might effect such change. But first we must ascertain what is meant by "substantive rights". One writer 84 answers that "primary rights are substantive" and a well-known jurist 15 informs us that "primary" or "antecedent" rights are those "which exist before any wrongful act or omission". But the late Justice Cardozo 16 pointed out the impracticability of any hard and fast distinction or separation of substantive rights from procedural; and this brings us very close to the conclusion reached by Chamberlayne s7 that: "The distinction between substantive and procedural law is artificial and illusory. In essence, there is none. The remedy and the predetermined machinery, so far as the litigant has a recognized claim to use it, are, legally speaking, part of the right itself. A right without a remedy for its violation is a command without a sanction, a brutum fulnen; i. e., no law at all."
It is evident that those who seek to separate substantive from procedural rights in the same connection encounter one of the most confused and complicated subjects in the law. 86. "The primary or antecedent right may be distinguished in analysis from the right of action for its infringement, but the normal exercise of the state's power is through the agency of the courts, and hence a right which, when violated, does not create a right of action, is shorn of most of the incidents that make a legal right of value." Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235, 241, Ill N. E. 837, 839 (1916) . Similar appear to have been the views of the late Justice Holmes: "But for legal purposes a right is only the hypostasis of a prophecy-the imagination of a substance supporting the fact that the public force will be brought to bear upon those who do things said to contravene it-just as we talk of the force of gravitation accounting for the conduct of bodies in space." COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 88. "It is no easy task to state with precision the exact nature of the distinction between substantive law and the law of procedure . . . there are many rules of procedure which, in their practical operation, are wholly or substantially equivalent to rules of substantive law. In such cases, the difference between these two branches of the law is one of form rather than of substance." SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (Parker's ed. 1937) 647, 649. more recent writers 89 leave the impression that there is really little or no fixed meaning for either of these phrases.
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In the Federal Covrts, the subject is now further complicated by a revolutionary decision "I (followed shortly afterwards by the promulgation of the new Civil Procedure Rules 92) which, however sound and justifiable, unfortunately upsets nearly a century's trend toward uniformity, 93 overrules a long line of prior decisions, 94 promises a snarl of conflicting rulings 95 by the lower federal courts which will require years to unravel, and raises new and serious questions as to the effect of the said Rules. 89. "Even if we find a precedent for holding a certain rule of one jurisdiction to be either of substance or of procedure, we must generally guard against the fallacy of assuming that such precedent is authority for a determination that the rule does not also affect procedure or substance." McClintock, mspra note 84, at 942.
"Nor does it follow that because 'evidence' may be classified as 'procedure' for some purposes, an item of evidence is to be accorded 'procedural' consequences for conflict-of-laws, constitutional law, or any other purpose." Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1937) (1915) , the statement that "the local rule" is "part of the very substance" of the litigant's case. But there the court refused to apply the state rule. The "revolutionary decision" was not discussed in this most recent opinion nor was Civil Procedure Rule 8 (c) cited. See also Schopp v. Muller Dairies, Inc. (declaring that since the said decision "there is no federal common law") 25 F. Supp. 5o (1938).
94. ". . . the United States courts have uniformly held that, as a matter of general law, the burden of proving contributory negligence is on the defendant. The Federal courts have enforced that principle even in trials in states which hold that the burden is on the plaintiff." Schopp v. Muller Dairies, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 5o, 5i (1938) and cases cited there. See also N. 0. and Northeastern Ry. Co. v. Harris, 247 U. S.
(1918).
"Matters respecting the remedy-such as the bringing of suits, admissibility of evidence, statutes of limitation-depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought." Hunt, J., in Scudder v. Union National Bank, 91 U. S. 406 IIl. 1938 ) it was held "that the absence of contributory negligence is made an essential part of plaintiff's cause of action by the substantive law of Illinois and . . . The Supreme Court, by a procedural rule, cannot take this burden from plaintiff and impose it upon defendant." Similar decisions in the future may seriously restrict the scope of Rule 8 (c) which, however, the court distinguished as applicable to defenses only. But see Tunks, supra note 89, at 279, 283.
Some state courts, indeed, treat as "substantive" a foreign rule requiring a party to prove freedom from contributory negligence 97 and where a Federal Court sits in such a jurisdiction it must now apply that rule. But there is an impressive array of authority for the contrary doctrine 98 and diversity is thus perpetuated. Contributors 99 to our legal periodicals have recognized the unfortunate situation thereby created and have sought a way out by resorting to decisions in the field of the conflict of laws. 10 0 But the results there seem to offer little hope for a satisfactory solution of our problem. 10 1 For we are con-
